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COMMENTS
Although the owner is sovereign over his land, he has the duty to con-
sider the safety of all those who, having the right or privilege to enter
his premises, may be expected to enter it. The "commonly accepted form-
ula in America" that divides those to whom this obligation is owed into
"licensees" and "invitees" depends upon whether their right to enter is by
virtue of permission or of invitation.6' If such is the case, it seems illogical
to hold, as most courts have, that a fireman cannot be an invitee because
there has been no invitation, but that he can be a licensee even though
there has been no permission.62
If we accept benefit to the landowner as the determining factor of the
invitee, it is equally difficult to see on what basis it can be held that a fire-
man is a mere licensee. 63 It is absurd to say that a fireman who comes to
extinguish a blaze in the defendant's building confers no benefit on the
defendant.64
Perhaps the real reason why firemen seem to be set apart as a class to
whom no duty is owed to inspect and prepare the premises is that they
enter at unforseeable moments, upon unusual parts of the premises, and
under circumstances of emergency, where care in preparation cannot
reasonably be looked for. As Professor Bohlen has stated:
It would be an obviously unreasonable burden to impose on landowners to
require them to keep the whole of their premises in such condition as to make
every part of it safe for those whose unusual and exceptional right of entry may
never accrue.... IT]he balance of social benefits can[not] require such a serious
restriction on the owner's use of his land, or justify the imposition of such a
burden on his exchequer, to prevent so vague a risk of so improbable an injury.65
61 Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of Their
Own Right, 69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 142, 237, 340 (1921).
62 Are Firemen & Policemen Licensees or Invitees?, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1157 (1937).
63 Ibid., at 1160.
64Prosser, Torts § 78 at 461 (2d ed., 1955); Prosser, Business Visitors & Invitees,
26 Minn. L. Rev. 573, 608-611 (1942).
65 Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 61, at 350-51.
EXCLUSIVE SALES RIGHTS GIVEN TO REAL
ESTATE BROKERS
When a real estate broker is employed to sell property, one of two
types of agreement is entered into; the first being a general listing where-
by the broker is given the bare right to sell the owner's property with the
broker receiving a commission for producing a purchaser. The second is
a so-called "exclusive" agreement of one kind or another whereby the
broker is given the exclusive agency to sell, or exclusive right to sell, for
a stipulated period of time- the broker's commission being due when or
if a purchaser is found.
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Upon occasion, an owner who has entered into such an "exclusive"
agreement gets the opportunity to sell the property during the exclusive
period to a buyer not in any way procured by the broker. If the owner
does sell to this person, though the broker has not yet found a purchaser
willing to buy according to the terms of the listing, a suit for a commis-
sion often results. Where only an exclusive agency to sell has been given,
and it appears that the owner sold his own property without the aid of
another broker, the broker's suit will fail in most jurisdictions.' Where,
however, a second broker appears to have sold the property during the
exclusive agency, some courts have allowed recovery. 2 The concern of
the courts for the broker's welfare in that situation and where an exclu-
sive right to sell has been given, has resulted in decisions which blur the
distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts, leaving the law in
a rather confused state. It is this situation primarily which will be ex-
amined here.
THE AGREEMENT-A UNILATERAL CONTRACT
In return for the broker's act of procuring a purchaser, the owner has
promised a commission. The broker's promise to find a purchaser is not
sought, nor is it given in the usual exclusive listing. It seems clear, there-
fore, that the owner has made an offer for a unilateral contract,3 and such
an offer may be revoked, whether it is said to be irrevocable or not, at any
time before performance of the act requested. 4
In Bartlett v. Keith, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, a broker had an exclusive right to sell certain property.5 The
owner, during the period, sold the property to a buyer of her own find-
ing. In disallowing recovery the court stated:
Here the condition was at least the procuring of a customer who was able,
willing, and ready to buy on the owner's terms. The plaintiff's contention that
1 Manzo v. Park, 220 Ark. 216, 247 S.W. 2d 12 (1952); E. A. Strout Western Realty
Agency v. Gregoire, 101 Cal. App. 2d 512, 225 P. 2d 585 (1951); Lambert v. Haskins,
128 Colo. 433, 263 P. 2d 433 (1953); Bradbury v. Morrison, 93 Ga. App. 704, 92 S.E. 2d
607 (1956); Wozniak v. Siegle, 226 IIl. App. 619 (1922); Des Rivieres v. Sullivan, 247
Mass. 443, 142 N.E. 111 (1924); Keller Corp. v. Cable, 207 Minn. 336, 291 N.W. 515
(1940); Levy v. Isaacs, 285 App. Div. 1170, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 519 (1955), appeal denied 143
N.Y.S. 2d 642 (1955); Ferree v. De Ely, 265 S.W. 2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App., 1954); Baker
v. Skipworth, 244 S.W. 2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App., 1951); Roberts v. Harrington, 168 Wis.
217, 169 N.W. 603 (1918). Contra: eVrner v. Hindle, 129 Pa. Super. 137, 194 At. 754
(1937).
2 Dixon v. Dodd, 80 A. 2d 282 (D.C. Munic. App., 1951); McManus v. Newcomb,
61 A. 2d 36 (D.C. Munic. App., 1948); Schwartz v. Akerlund, 240 111. App. 480 (1926).
3 "A unilateral contract is one in which no promisor receives a promise as consider-
ation for his promise." Rest., Contracts § 12 (1932).
4 1 Williston, Contracts § 60 (Rev. ed., 1936).
5 325 Mass. 265, 90 N.E. 2d 308 (1950).
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by listing the property she fully performed the service required is fallacious.
The writing says nothing of the kind, and the usual rule is to the contrary.
The defendant's objective, like that of any seller, did not stop with the placing
of her property on the plaintiff's list. Nor is the plaintiff's case aided by asserting
that the defendant bound herself for ninety days when she did not bind herself
at all. The acceptance of an offer to a unilateral contract must be by all the acts
contemplated by the offer. There was no fraudulent revocation, and once the
question of consideration is analyzed, this case falls within the usual principles
of brokerage cases. 6
This statement represents proper legal reasoning in requiring considera-
tion be given to make a promise to keep an offer open binding. 7
An Illinois court presented with a similar factual situation refused to
grant a commission to the broker and said: "[Tihe agreement in this pro-
ceeding is not one coupled with an interest and it was revocable at the
will of the principals."
An Ohio court, where the broker sued for a commission when the own-
er sold his own property during the "exclusive sales right" period, stated:
[P]laintiff did not purchase the exclusive right to sell the defendant's property.
There was no consideration flowing to defendants. The plaintiff was not bound
to do anything. He could abstain from any activities in the interest of selling
the property without incurring the slightest legal liability to the defendants.
The offer to contract was unilateral in its effect.9
Where even nominal consideration has been given in fact by the broker
for the owner's promise to keep the offer for a unilateral contract open
for a given period, the offer must be kept open.10 In a state where a seal
is conclusive evidence of consideration, such an offer under seal would
also have to be kept open." These methods for rendering the owner's
offer irrevocable do not often appear in the reported cases as the basis for
decision.
A few courts have applied proper theory. 12 Numerically, courts apply-
6 Ibid., at 309, 310 (omitting court's citations).
7 Rest., Contracts § 19 (1932).
8 Nicholson v. Alderson, 347 Ill. App. 496, 507, 107 N.E. 2d 39, 44 (1952).
9 Davis v. Hora, 63 N.E. 2d 843, 844 (Ohio App., 1944).
10 1 Williston, Contracts S 115, 115B (Rev. ed., 1936).
11 Whyte v. Rogers, 303 Ill. App. 115, 24 N.E. 2d 745 (1940). For a discussion of more
recent developments concerning seals, see An Analysis of Recent Illinois Legislation
Concerning Seals, 1 DeP. L.R. 250 (1952).
12 Cole v. Pursley, 86 Ga. App. 452, 71 S.E. 2d 575 (1952) where factor of payment
of nominal consideration was ignored; Irish v. Fisher, 74 Ga. App. 631, 40 S.E. 2d 588
(1946); Ocean Lake & River Fish Co. v. Dotson, 70 Ga. App. 268, 28 S.E. 2d 319 (1943);
Barrington v. Dunwody, 35 Ga. App. 517, 134 S.E. 130 (1926); Ferguson v. Bovee,
239 Iowa 775, 32 N.W. 2d 924 (1948) but weakened by allowing damages to extent of
"out of pocket" loss to broker.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
ing proper theory are in the minority. The unsound methods by which
the other courts reach their conclusions follow.
POWER TO REVOKE VERSUS RIGHT TO REVOKE
Several courts have spoken in terms of power to revoke versus right to
revoke, admitting the power of the owner to revoke the agreement, but
claiming that he had no right to do so, in that the employment contract
was broken.' 3 Professor Mechem is quoted as follows:
[T]he principal always has the power to revoke: but not ... the right to do so
in those cases wherein he has agreed not to exercise his power during a cer-
tain period ... the authority may be withdrawn at any moment, but the contract
of employment cannot be terminated in violation of its terms, without making
the principal liable in damages. 14
This statement then presupposes a contract, a binding agreement. Later
statements by Professor Mechem concerning the necessity of contract in
the broker-owner relationship make this even more clear:
[T]he principal may agree-for a sufficient consideration-that, during a stated
period, he will not sell except through the broker, or that the broker shall have
his commission whoever makes the sale .... 15
Therefore, it is submitted that the courts that apply the power versus
right to revoke rules have begged the question of whether a contract
exists at all or not. Unless the owner for a consideration has contracted
away his right to revoke, he may do so at any time.1 A contract, then,
has still to be found.
PROMISE TO PROCURE AND PROMISE TO TRY TO PROCURE
It is true that the possible harshness of the rule allowing revocation of
offers for unilateral contracts at any time is the basis for a rule of law
which would construe such offers and assents as bilateral, and therefore, as
contracts, if at all feasible.'7 Few brokers would agree that they have
promised to find a purchaser in return for the owner's promise to pay a
commission, not wishing to risk a suit for damages for not finding a
buyer.'8 Most brokers, however, would agree that they have promised to
try to find a purchaser. Some courts have considered such promise to be
13 E.g., Geyler v. Dailey, 70 Ariz. 135, 217 P. 2d 583 (1950) where the broker found a
purchaser on the day after revocation; Ferguson v. Bovee, 239 Iowa 775, 32 N.W. 2d 924
(1948); Isern v. Gordon, 127 Kan. 296, 273 Pac. 435 (1929) where nominal consider-
ation was given, but not relied on.
14 1 Mechem on Agency 568 (2d ed., 1914) (italics added).
15 2 Mechem on Agency § 2445 (2d ed., 1914) (italics added).
16 1 Mechem on Agency § 563, 565, 566 (2d ed., 1914).
17 Rest., Contracts S 31 (1932).
18 2 Mechem on Agency § 2429 (2d ed., 1914). No case has been found where the
broker promised specifically to find a purchaser.
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part of the consideration requiring that the broker keep the offer open or
be guilty of breach of contract. 19 The courts do not rely, however, on the
promise to try exclusively. In Jones v. Hollander it is stated that: "the
consideration is the agreement of the broker to try to obtain a purchaser
and his actual efforts in that regard .... ,,20
The promise to try is subject to the objection that it is too vague, and
therefore, void.21 However, in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, a
promise to use reasonable efforts was implied and upheld, as being prop-
er.22 A federal court in New York was faced with a situation wherein
the defendant had given plaintiff the exclusive right to sell its wholly
owned subsidiary.23 Defendant then sold the business himself prior to re-
voking plaintiff's authority, and plaintiff sued for a commission. In find-
ing the agreement to be bilateral, the court cited the Lucy case and stated
that: ". . . Braxton's promise to work intensively, since a speedy sale was
desired, and to handle the matter with the utmost discretion may be fairly
implied." 24
But, is it to be supposed that the owner's promise to keep the offer open
was "bargained for and given in exchange" for the broker's promise to
use "efforts" to sell? If the broker were to list the property at all, his ef-
forts would be a foregone conclusion if he hoped to earn a commission.
No real element of bargaining appears-the owner simply holds out a
prize for the broker to take or not, as he is able or chooses. There has been
no case reported where the owner has recovered damages for the broker's
inactivity. The broker's degree of activity is of relatively little importance
to the owner. The only thing that matters to the owner is the production
of a buyer who is ready, willing and able to meet the owner's terms of sale.
If the broker could do this without getting out of his chair or lifting a
telephone, the owner would be satisfied.
However, if the broker did refuse to attempt to sell the property ex-
cept on the condition that he be given an exclusive right to sell, and the
owner, because he wanted this particular broker to sell the property, gave
the broker this right, the owner might properly be said to have bargained
for the broker's efforts, and hence be bound by his agreement to keep the
offer open. 25 This probably is not the usual case. Most businessmen do
not so easily turn away a possible client.
l9 Piper v. Wells, 175 Md. 326, 2 A. 2d 28 (1938); Melzner v. Toman, 57 N.D. 639,
223 N.W. 691 (1929); Jones v. Hollander, 3 N.J.M. 973, 130 At. 451 (1925).
20 3 N.J.M. 973, 130 Ad. 451, 452 (1925).
21 Rest., Contracts § 32 (1932).
22 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
23 Hammond v. C.I.T. Financial Corp., 203 F. 2d, 705 (C.A. 2d, 1953).
24 Ibid., at 708.
25 2 Mechem on Agency § 2453 (2d ed., 1914). This rationale has not been found in
any reported case.
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THE PART PERFORMANCE THEORY
The most popular method, however, of protecting the broker's com-
mission under an "exclusive" agreement involves section 45 of the Re-
statement of Contracts.26 Here it is admitted that the agreement was uni-
lateral to begin with, but by "part performance" the broker is said to ac-
cept the owner's offer for a unilateral contract, rendering the agreement
bilateral and hence irrevocable.2 7
Baumgartner v. Meek, a California decision which followed this theory,
quoted section 45 and disposed of the contention that there was no con-
sideration to support the contract by stating that is was to be found in the
services to be performed by the broker.28 An Ohio statute referring to
unilateral contracts was as follows:
The contract does not come into existence until one party to it has done
all that is necessary on his part; it is performance by one party which makes
obligatory the promise of the other.29
The court's interpretation follows:
Conceding that at the time the contract was signed and accepted it was a
mere nudum pactum, when the plaintiff exerted her efforts to find a purchaser
for the property, consideration was supplied. s°
Apparently the statute was taken as meaning "part performance," not
"performance" as it stated. Advertising, phone calls, and showing the
property to prospective purchasers, then, are said to constitute part per-
formance. Theoretically as least, this is not part performance of the act
of producing a purchaser, because purchasers do not come in parts-one
is either found, whole and entire, or he is not. Efforts to find one are mere
preparations to the performance of the act of producing the purchaser.
What is tendered must be part of the actual performance requested in order
to preclude revocation under this Section [45]. Beginning preparations though
they may be essential to carrying out the contract or to accepting the offer is
not enough.81
26 Rest., Contracts § 45 (1932). If "part of the consideration requested in the offer
is given or tendered by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a con-
tract." For an excellent criticism of this doctrine see Anderson, Mutual Assent in Uni-
lateral Contracts, 1 DeP. L.R. 167 (1952).
27 E.g., Baumgartner v. Meek, 126 Cal. App. 2d 505, 272 P. 2d 552 (1954); Harry H.
Rosin Co. v. Eksterowicz, 45 Del. 314, 73 A. 2d 648 (1950); Hutchinson v. Dobson-
Bainbridge Realty Co., 31 Tenn. App. 490, 217 S.W. 2d 6 (1946).
28 126 Cal. App. 2d 505, 272 P. 2d 552 (1954).
29 9 Ohio Juris. 239, § 5.
30 Bell v. Dimmerling, 149 Ohio St. 165, 78 N.E. 2d 49 (1948).
31 Rest., Contracts § 45, Comment a (1932) (italics added).
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Most conclusive is the fact that the owner did not promise to reward
efforts, but only performance, though the efforts might have been in some
way foreseeable.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
The theory of promissory estoppel, which does away with the necessity
of consideration, is stated as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
of a definite and substantial character upon the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action, is binding, if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise.32
In Richter v. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati it was said that "whethei
consideration existed upon the making of the promise would be important
if an action for breach of one or the other had been instituted before the
parties had acted upon the promise .... ,.3 The broker had an exclusive
right to sell several lots, had sold all but the last, which the owner sold,
without notice to the broker, on his own. In allowing recovery of the
commission, the court mentioned promissory estoppel and went on to
state:
To now limit his commission to such sales only as he initiated and carried to
fulfillment would operate as an injustice to him.3 4
Justice to the owner was not discussed.
A Missouri court, in a situation where an owner had granted an exclu-
sive right to sell and then had sold the property during that period, to a
buyer of his own finding, stated:
While the Agreement did not expressly bind plaintiffs [broker] to do any-
thing at all and plaintiffs had no interest in the subject matter of the agency,
plaintiffs, it may be inferred, listed the property and . . .acted [court's italics]
in the endeavor to procure a purchaser, spending considerable time and money
... upon the performance of these stipulated acts in reliance upon the defend-
ants' promise the Agreement became a bilateral one and binding upon the
defendants.,3 5
This court then does not specifically adopt the doctrine, but the rationale
is present, and in some degree controlling.
This analysis, like others, is subject to the criticism that the owner
promised only to reward success, not efforts, and that the nature of a uni-
32 Rest., Contracts S 90 (1932).
s3 82 Ohio App. 421, 80 N.E. 2d 243, 245, 246 (1947).
34 Ibid., at 246.
35 Chamberlain v. Grisham, 360 Mo. App. 655, 230 S.W. 2d 721, 723 (1950) (italics
added).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
lateral contract is such that certain things must be done preparatory to
acceptance. All this is within the contemplation of the parties at the time
of the offer and efforts to accept are entered into with the realization that
they might fail, in the ordinary course of business. The section 90, Re-
statement of Contracts (quoted above), version of the doctrine has had
only slight usage as the actual basis for decision among the courts of last
resort of the commercial states.86
SPECIFIC JURISDICTIONS
In Hutchinson v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co.,37 a Tennessee appel-
late court adopted the 'part performance" rationale in a decision which
was mentioned by many other courts.38 A few year later, in Hood v.
Gillespie, the court allowed a seller, under an exclusive agency agreement,
to withdraw his property from sale without liability.3 9 Apparently the
fact that the owner had not agreed not to take the land off the market
was controlling. The broker's "part performance" availed him nothing.
Then, in Jenkins v. Vaughan, the Tennessee Supreme Court refused a
commission to a broker where the owner had sold the property himself
during the exclusive period.40 The basis for this decision was that the
broker's efforts had been insufficient to warrant a commission. The court
acknowledged the rule of the Hutchinson case, but stated:
The reason for the rule is avoidance of hardship to a broker, who has spent
time and money in an effort to sell and may have created a market or stimulated
a demand for the property.41
Tennessee, then, would weigh the efforts of the broker, determining
whether they constitute "part performance" or not. This is not a very
certain rule at best, and seems more equitable than legal.
New York, according to decision and dictum in the lower courts, is
committed to the rule that when an exclusive right to sell has been given,
the owner may not revoke without becoming liable for a commission. 42
Two very early cases are relied on as having established this rule. The first
was Moses v. Bierling which stated the rule as follows:
36 Restatement in the Courts § 90 (1945) (supplemented by later editions in 1949 and
1954).
37 31 Tenn. App. 490, 217 S.W. 2d 552 (1954).
38 E.g., Harry H. Rosin Co. v. Eksterowicz, 45 Del. 314, 73 A. 2d 648 (1950);
McManus v. Newcomb, 61 A. 2d 36 (D.C. Munic. App., 1948).
39 190 Tenn. 548, 230 S.W. 2d 997 (1950).
40 197 Tenn. 578, 276 S.W. 2d 732 (1955).
41 Ibid., at 733.
42 Gaillard Realty Co., Inc. v. Rogers Wire Works, Inc., 215 App. Div. 326, 213
N.Y. Supp. 616 (1926); Levy v. Isaacs, 285 App. Div. 1170, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 519 (1955),
appeal denied 143 N.Y.S. 2d 642 (1955) (dictum); 'Werner v. Eurich, 263 App. Div. 744,
31 N.Y.S. 2d 233 (1941) (dictum).
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•.. [W]hen one of the contracting parties prevents or waives the literal per-
formance of a condition precedent, which the other is ready and offers to fulfill,
he cannot avail himself of such non-performance to relieve him from his own
obligation.
A broker, employed to make a sale, under an agreement for the exclusion of
all other agencies, is entitled to his commissions when he produces a party ready
to make the purchase at a satisfactory price. . . .43
In that case the owner had sold four thousand muskets through another
agent, and had, therefore, refused to sell to the buyer found by the plain-
tiff. The other case, Levy v. Rothe, involved a situation where considera-
tion had been paid for a sole agency, the owner sold his own property,
and the broker recovered a commission.
4 4
In the Moses case it appears that the broker probably found a buyer
prior to the revocation of his authority, in which case, he was obviously
entitled to his commission. Were the buyer found after revocation, the
result perhaps would have differed. The offer, in the Levy case, was given
for consideration and therefore binding. These two cases then are not
entitled to their position as establishing a rule allowing the broker to
recover when the owner sells the property himself under the usual "ex-
clusive right to sell" agreement.
Ohio courts have arrived at decisions applying proper theory, 45 prom-
issory estoppel, 46 and the part performance theory. 47 Pennsylvania courts
have allowed the broker a commission where the owner sold the property
himself during the exclusive agency, or right to sell period. 48 Vatious
other courts have allowed the broker to recover a commission with no
discussion of the lack of consideration being given for the owner's prom-
ise to keep the offer open.49
Some jurisdictions have allowed revocation, but have allowed the
broker to recover on a quantum meruit basis.50 This view is criticized in
43 31 N.Y. 462, 464 (1865).
44 17 Misc. 402, 39 N.Y. Supp. 1057 (1896).
45 Davis v. Hora, 63 N.E. 2d 843 (Ohio App., 1944).
46 Richter v. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati, 82 Ohio App. 421, 80 N.E. 2d 243 (1947).
47 Bell v. Dimmerling, 149 Ohio St. 165, 78 N.E. 2d 49 (1948).
4SByme v. Bushkoff, 177 Pa. Super. 101, 110 A. 2d 813 (1955) "exclusive right to
sell"; John Whiteman & Co. v. Fidei, 176 Pa. Super. 142, 106 A. 2d 644 (1954); Werner
v. Hindle, 129 Pa. Super. 137, 194 At. 754 (1937) exclusive agency.
49Piatt & Heath Co. v. Wilmer, 87 Mont. 382, 288 Pac. 1021 (1930); Melzner v.
Toman, 57 N.D. 639, 223 N.W. 691 (1929); Torrey & Dean, Inc. v. Coyle, 138 Ore. 509,
7 P. 2d 260 (1932); Holmes v. Halik, 238 S.W. 2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App., 1951) which
quoted Bell v. Dimmerling, 149 Ohio St. 165, 78 N.E. 2d 49 (1948) at length.
50 Geyler v. Dailey, 70 Ariz. 135, 217 P. 2d 583 (1950) where the commission was
allowed because broker found a buyer the day after the revocation; Ferguson v. Bovee,
239 Iowa 775, 32 N.W. 2d 924 (1948). See Nicholson v. Alderson, 347 ill. App. 496,
107 N.E. 2d 39 (1952).
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John T. Burns & Sons, Inc. v. Brasco where it was stated that whatever
the owner promised, he did not promise to pay the broker the fair value
of his services, nor did he get anything of value for those services. 51 Either
the owner was liable for a commission or he was not liable at all. Allowing
recovery on a quantun meruit basis is prompted by sympathy for the
broker, and not legal theory.
In 1952, an Illinois court, in Nicholson v. Alderson, followed proper
legal theory and refused to grant a broker a commission, where the owner
sold his property after written notice of revocation during the exclusive
period, no consideration being given for the exclusive by the broker.52
Earlier decisions were less astute. In Schwartz v. Akerland (1926) a
broker was allowed to recover a commission where the owner had sold
the property through another broker during the exclusive agency period.5n
The broker's advertisement was held to be consideration for the promise
to keep the offer open. Wozniak v. Siegle, four years earlier, did not al-
low a commission in a similar situation. 54 In 1911, in Pretzel v. Anderson, a
broker was refused a commission under an exclusive agency agreement
where he found a purchaser within the period, but after revocation by
the owner.55 The court stated:
The contract is not under seal, and was not paid for when given. It is uni-
lateral, it is maintained, and without consideration-a nudum pactum, liable to
be revoked at will ... [as to contentions that advertising, etc. constituted con-
sideration, it was said] we do not think, however, this a consideration which
makes the agency irrevocable either generally or for any time specified there-
in.56
CONCLUSION
About forty years ago, a New Jersey court, in allowing a broker to
recover in a situation similar to that discussed here, claimed that the gov-
erning rule was a "doctrine of public policy intended to effectuate justice
between the parties."57 This statement explains all the twisting and turn-
ing done to allow the broker a commission, but does not explain the ne-
cessity for overthrowing the common-law rule requiring consideration for
a promise in order to make it binding. That rule, too, has for its basis the
intention to "effectuate justice between the parties." Consider the mort-
gagor, in 1954, pressed to meet payments, who decided to sell his property,
giving a broker an exclusive right to sell for no consideration.58 Two
51327 Mass. 261, 98 N.E. 2d 262 (1951).
52 347 II1. App. 496, 107 N.E. 2d 39 (1952).
58 240 I11. App. 480 (1926).
54 226 11. App. 619 (1922).
55 162 I11. App. 538 (1911). 56 Ibid., at 541.
57 Stevenson Co. v. Oppenheimer, 91 N.J.L. 479, 104 Atd. 88 (1918).
58 John Whiteman & Co. v, Fidei, 176 Pa. Super. 142, 106 A. 2d 644 (1954),
COMMENTS
months later when the broker had not yet sold the property, this mort-
gagor, under threat of foreclosure, reconveyed to the mortgagee. This
was held to constitute a sale within contemplation of the parties, and the
mortgagor-seller had to pay a commission though he had received no con-
sideration for his irrevocable offer. Suffice to say, the equities are not al-
ways with the broker. A resurgence of the doctrine of consideration to
render a promise binding might better "effectuate justice between the
parties."
The basic fallacy in this area is the supposition that the owner bargained
for the broker's efforts, or that these efforts constitute an acceptance of
the owner's offer. It is submitted that this is contrary to the agreement,
and to the owner's promise, which would reward only success, regardless
of verbiage about "services." "The acceptance of a unilateral contract
must be by all the acts contemplated by the offer."59
59 Bartlett v. Keith, 325 Mass. 265, 90 N.E. 2d 308, 310 (1950).
MATTER OF TOTTEN-AN ANOMALY IN
THE LAW OF TRUSTS
The term Totten Trust' is a familiar one.2 A comprehension of the
meaning of the term exists in the minds of the majority of lawyers to
varying degrees. Yet, the very danger of the Totten Trust lies in this
vague familiarity which leads to various misconceptions.
Many lawyers feel that the Totten Trust is the law throughout the
land, and that it is certainly the law in their particular jurisdiction, though
the question may never have been litigated. There are those who accept
it as a valid trust without question, completely overlooking its transgres-
sion of many of the settled concepts of trust law. Oftentimes, bank ac-
counts for more than a single person are indiscriminately labeled as
Totten Trusts.3
The purpose of this discussion is to dispel the misunderstandings and
doubts concerning the Totten Trust. The analysis of this anomaly 4 in the
' Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
2 The Totten Trust is often referred to as a "tentative trust" also.
3 See footnote 30 for a treatment of the problem.
4 In 1905 the case Matter of Totten was thought to be judicial legislation. For example,
one author said:
"This decision has been widely commented upon by legal journals and, so far as the
writer is aware, has been unanimously disapproved. It is inconsistent with earlier au-
thorities in the State of New York. It introduces a serious anomaly into the law of
trusts; indeed, a trust that is revocable at the will of the creator can hardly be said to be
a trust at all. It impugns the policy of the statute of wills, by permitting a disposition of
property to take effect only after death, without following the testamentary require-
ments. On the other hand, as a piece of constructive legislation the decision could hard-
ly be too highly praised. It effectuates a custom which has grown up among the hum-
